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l. SUMMARY: 
Cer{ t;;.c: ~ircuit (with 
(~_9_zelo_~ [SJ J . J'7.A . , .... e' ten- ' 
& Parl<er fDJ) ;.....-~n)~ 
:£amm, 
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The primary question presented is whether LEAA --officials are absolutely immune f om personal damages liability 
f or failing to irtitiate administrative proceedings to ter~inate 
LEAA funding to state and local law enforcement agenci es that 
allegedly were engaging in discriminatory personnel practices . 
Petrs contend (l) that the CA erred in rejecting their absolute 
1 The SG has filed ape :·1on on · f of Richard w. 
Velde, LEAA Administrator, dward II. Levi former Attorney 
Gene ral , Charles n. Work, D·AA Deputy Adm' 1istrator, and Herbert 





immunity claim and (2) that if they are not absolutely immune, 
the CA should have held that resps failed to state a cause of 
action for damages under the Fifth Amendment or that petrs are 
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. 
2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: In 1975, resps -- six blacks, 
six women and an organization that represents black police 
officers -- filed a suit against petrs in USDC (D.D.C). Resps 
alleged that state and local law enforcement agencies that had 
received and were receiving LEAA grants had discriminated against 
them,2 and that the LEAA, the De~ 't of Justice, and petrs3 had 
unlawfully failed to terminate LEAA f unding to these agencies, 
despite evidence that the funds had been used to discriminate on 
grounds of race and sex. Resps sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief and also sought compensatory and punitive damages against 
petrs in their individual capacities. 
Section 518 (c) (1) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 (''the Act") prohibits any recipient of LEAA 
funds from discriminating on the basis o f "race, color, national 
origin or sex." 42 U.S.C. §37G6 (c) (1). The Act provides f.or the 
ter mination of LEAA funding to recipients that violate this 
prohibition. [I shall describe these provisions as they existed 
at the time this suit was filed, although the ~revisions were 
2Resps alleged that they were denied employment, passed 
over for promotion, or discharged solely on the basis of their 
race or sex by recipien ts of LEAA funds. 
3Petrs ar~ listed in not2 1, supra. 
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, ,..,. amended in 1976.] Section 518 (c) (2), 42 u.s.c. §3766 (c) (2), 
v 
provides that whenever the LEAA determines that a recipient of 
LEAA funds is discriminating or otherwise failing to comply with 
LEAA's regulations, 
"[LEAA] shall notify the chief executive of the State of 
the noncompliance and shall request the chief executive 
to secure compliance. If within a reasonable time after 
such notification the chief executive fails or refuses to 
secure compliance, the [LEAA) shall exercise the powers 
and functions provided in section 3757 .... " 
42 u.s.c. §3757 (s ection 509 of ~he Act) provides that if after 
reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing, the LEAA 
finds that "there is a substantial failure to comply," it "shall 
notify such applicant or grantee that further payment shall not 
be made (or in its discretion that further payment shall not be 
( _? made for activities in which there is such failure), until there 
is no longer such failure." In 1976, noting that the LEAA had 
not terminated its funding of any recipient pursuant to these 
sections, Congress added more detailed procedures to be followed 
by the LEAA in securing compliance with the antidiscrimination 
in 
provi s ion ana/terminating funds to noncomplying recipi ents . 
In 1976 the DC dismis sed resps' suit , holding: (1) the 1976 
amendments had rendered moot recps' claims for declaratory and 
injunctive relief, and (2) resps ' claims for morietary damages 
against petrs in their individu a l capacities were barred by the 
doctrine of absolute immunity. A divided CA reversed. 
The CADC [B azelon, Parker (DJ)) held that the 1976 
amendments bad not rendered moot resps' request for injunctive 
and declaratory relief. It also held that the DC had erred in 
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dismissing resps' claims for damages on the ground of absolute 
' 
immunity. Relying on Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the 
CA stated that as a general rule federal officials may only rely 
on the doctrine of qualified immunity in su its raising 
constitutional violations. Absolute immunity is provided only 
where "essential for the conduct of the public business." 438 
u.s. 507. Absolute immunity is necessary to protect 
discretionary prosecutorial decisions from the potentially 
distorting effect of civil liabil ity. However, petrs had 
virtually no discretion under the relevant statute in deciding 
whether to terminate LEAA funding of discriminatory recipients: 
"The mandatory language of 42 u.s.c. § 3766(c) (2) 
••. when read in ligh t of [petrs'] 
constitutional and independent statutory duty not 
to allow federal funding to be used in a 
discriminatory manner by recipi ents, takes 
[petrs'] civil rights enforcement duties outside 
the realm of discretion. 
"The minimal matters le ft to LEAA's judgment--
such as the assessment of 'reasonable time after 
notification'--do not rise to the level of 
prosecutorial discretion that is protected by 
absolute i mmun i ty ." (Petn, at 6a & n.l5). 
The CA concluded that resps "should be allowed to go to 
tri al on thei r claims for damag es" and that petrs could seck to 
establish a defense of qualified immunity.4 
4rrhe majority also held tl1c:~t resps had standing to 
maintain their suit. It stated that the police off icers' 
association had alleged harm to itself and its members as a 
result of petrs' alleged failure to terminate funding to 
discriminatory recipients and that the i ndividual appellants had 
alleged violations of their right to be free from federal funding 
of state and local agencie~ that have discriminated against them. 
Furthermore, 
( _ 
( , __ 
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Judge Tamm agreed with Judge Bazelon's analysis of the 
mootness issue, but disagreed with the majority's holding on 
absolute immuni ty. First, he asserted that decisions not to 
prosecute must be given the same protection as decisions to 
prosecute. Second, he stated that the type of decision-making 
entrusted to petrs is exactly what the Supreme Court had in mind 
when it spoke of functions 11 analogous to those of the 
11 [t]he 1976 amendments to the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 
which added a judicial review provision for parties such 
as appellants, remove any doubt as to appellants' 
standing .. •. and we are satisfied that--absent a failure 
of proof after discovery is completed--appellants have 
standing to maintain this action ... 
(Petn, at 7a, n.l6) 
Judge Tamm agreed that resps had standing, although he 
considered it a more difficult issue than did the majority. As 
to the effect of the 1976 amendments, he noted that Congress 
cannot grant Art. III standing, and he concluded that Congress 
had not attempted to vary the applicat1on of prudential standing 
principles to this type of suit, since the 1976 amendments merely 
authorized private suits against LEAA recipients that practiced 
discrimination. Reviewing the legislative history, Judge Tamm 
concluded that Congress had considered and rejected permitting a 
statutory action against federal officials for failure to 
terminate funding. He acknowledged that this 11 [might] well bear 
on the merits of plaintiffs' cl a ims in th is case ... However, 
''[l]ike the majority," he considered it inadvisable to e xpress 
any view on the merits at this stage in the litigation. 
Judge Tamm stated that plaintiffs did not have standing 
merely because they objected to the usc of federal funds to 
support unlawful discrimi11ation . Rather, pl~intiffs had ulleged 
a distinct personal injury by c la iming that recipients of LEAA 
funds had discriminated against them. Judge Tamm was still 
troubled by whether the pl a inti:fs had shown an injury tbdt would 
be likely to be redressed by a ~avorable decision. See Simon v. 
Eastern Kentucky_ Welfar~_8..i9.hts Organizatiot~, 426 U.S. i6, 38 
(1975). However, he concluded that plaintiffs should have an 
opportunity to conduct discovery before this issue was finally 
resolved. (Petn, at 14a.) 
-6-
I-,. '- prosecutor." Bu tz v. Economou, supra, at 515. Judge 'l'amm 
( 
c--
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that §3766 (c) (2) granted 
petrs virtually no discretion. LEAA officials must determine 
that a governmental unit has violated the nondiscrimination 
provision~ seek voluntary compliance by the governmental unit 
with the assistance of the chief executive of the state involved~ 
decide when a reasonable time has passed after such assistance 
has been unsuccessfully requested~ and then terminate funding 
only if there has been a substantial failure to comply with the 
nondiscrimination provisions. LEAA officials also have 
discretion in determining whether a partial or complete 
termination of funds should be ordered. Judge Tamm reserved the 
issue of whether the 1976 amendments would affect the ability of 
LEAA officials to claim absolute immunity for conduct arising 
after the effective date of those amendments. He acknowledged 
that the 1976 amendments were designed to limit the discretion of 
LEAA officials in the termination of funds to recipients wh o 
practiced di scr i mination. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends : (1) Pctrs are entitled to 
absolute immunity. In ~u t_?:._~-· Ec:onomou r the Court statec] that 
"agency officials must make the decision to move forw::l.rd with an 
administ ~a tive proceeding free fr om int imidation or harassmer1t." 
438 U.S. at 515-516. The Court made it clear that the same 
protection must apply to adJnini3trative decisions not to bring 
charges. Petrs' exercise of prosecutorial discretion was 
precisely the type of decision-~aking the Court sought to 
insulate from the intimidation and distortion that accompanies 
-7-
(; the possibility c£ personal damages liability. Judge Tamm 
correctly pointed out that the relevant statutory provisions, 
like numerous other statutes governing the termination of federal 
funding, require the exercise of substantial discretion. 
Fur thermore, even if the evidence indicated that a -
recipient of funds was engaged in substantial discrimination, 
petrs had discretion to decline to commence a fund termination 
proceeding. Although 42 u.s.c. §3766 (c) (2) states that "if 
within a reasonable time after such notification the chief 
executive fails or refuses to secure compliance, the fLEAA] shall 
exercise the powers and functions provided in§ 3757," similar 
mandatory language in other statutes has been interpreted as 
preserving broad prosecutorial discretion. See,~.~ ., 28 u.s.c. 
§ 547 (providing that u.s. Attorneys "shall prosecute for all 
offenses against the United States"). 
In appropriate circumstances an administrative prosecutor's 
decision may be subject to limited judicial review, but the 
prosecutor may not be subjected to a personal damages suit. 
(2) Resps apparently claim that petrs violated the Fifth 
Amendment. Resps do not appear to assert a statu tory right to 
damages, and the l'?S :i. slat i ve hi story of the Ac L: doer; not sugs; est 
that Con9ress intended to permit damages claims ag a inst LEAA 
o fficials . Petrs argued before the DC and the CA that even if 
petrs were not entitled to absolute immunity, the damages claim 
should be dismissed for failur0 to state a constitutional cause 
of action. The CA declineci to address this point. Although some 
local police d~partments may have violated resps ' constitutional 
-8-
rights, it is apparent that petrs did not. Cf. Francis-Sobel v. 
Univer sity of Maine, 597 F.2d 15 (CAl), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
949 (1979) (dism~ssing suit for damages against an EEOC official 
for failing to give proper handling to the plaintiff's 
discrimination complaint against a state univer s ity). Since 
petrs did not purposely cause or affirmatively encourage the 
alleged discriminatory conduct, the discrimination cannot be 
conside red "federal action." 
(3) The CA also erred in declining to address petrs' 
contention that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a 
matter of l aw . No Supreme Court or CA decision has suggested 
that the mere failure to termin a te federal funding gives rise to 
a Fifth Amendment claim for damages. Thus, petrs had no reason 
to believe that their actions were violating resps ' 
constitutional rights. Furthermore, nothing in resps' complaint 
or the record suggests that petrs acted in bad faith. 
Resps contend: (1) The only issu e properly before this 
Court is vhether petrs are entitled to absolute immunity . The 
other issues were not addressed by the courts below. (2) Resps 
did not just allege a constitutional cause of action. They 
alleged that "petitioners' uniformr knowing fLmding of 
di scriminatory law enforcement agencies violated the Fifth 
Amendment , §518(c) of the Crima Con trol Act, and other federal 
statutes [including 42 u.s.c. §1985(3)) ." Resps' Brief, at 3. 
Resps ' Fifth Amendment claim Wds based on the established 
principle that "the Federal Governme nt could not under the 
Constitution give direct financial aid to [recipients] practicing 
-., 
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••• disc rimination. " Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164 
(D.D.C. 1971) (thr ee-judge court), aff ' d' sub nom. Coit v. Green, 
404 u.s . 997 (1971). See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 
(1973). (3) Resps alleged that petrs' behavior was intentional, 
willful and malicious. Resps have not yet been permitted to 
pursue discovery. Thus, it is inappropriate for petrs to contend 
that this Court should hold as a matter of law that petrs acted 
in good faith. (4) The CA properly determined that petrs were 
not entitled to absolute immunity. LEAA officials have no 
discretion with regard to initiating fund termination proceedings 
once there has been a determination of discrimination. 
Furthermore, the record establishes that petrs did not exercise 
discretion in individual cases. Instead, they adopted and 
followed an administrative policy of never initiating fund 
termination proceedings . This policy -- set out in 28 C.P.R. 
§42.206(a) --stated an agency preference for referring all 
matters of noncompliance to the Justice Department for possible 
litigation, rather than initiating administrative fund 
termination proceedings.S The policy was changed three months 
after lbis suit was filed. Thus, LEAA officiols did not. function 
in a manner an~logous to prosecu ting attorneys. 
528 C. P.R. §42.206(n ) (1975) provided in part: 
''[W]here the responsible Department official determines 
that judicial proceedings ... are as likely or more 
likely to result in co~pliance than administrative 
proceedings ... he shall invo~e the judicial r ather than 
the administrative remedy." 
( .. 
-10- ----------------------------------
4. DISCUSSION: Although petrs do not raise this issue, the 
' 
first issue that would confront the Court in this case if cert 
were granted is whether resps have standing. (The standing issue 
is discussed at note 2, supr~. ) I find this issue more difficult 
than the majority did, and I agree with Judge Tamm that Simon v. 
Kentucl~y Welfare Rights Organization makes the standing issue 
particularly troublesome.6 
The absolute immunity claim is an important issue , since 
many federal statutes include fund termination provisions. 
However, I am not convinced that the CA erred in rejecting petrs' 
absolute immunity claim. Although the conditions precedent to 
the LEAA's obligation to initiate fund termination proceedings 
involve certain subjective judgments on the part of LEAA 
(.2::-' officials (e.g. , whether there has been a "substantia l failure to 
comply"), I do not read the Act as granting the LEAA discretion 
to decline to commence fund termination proceedings even if the 
LEAA has determined that all the conditions precedent have been 
6simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Riqhts Organization, 
426 u.s. 2G (1976), -incorporates an injury:-In-·fact:e"lemcnt into 
the threshoJd issue of stand.ing. Resps may find i.t difficult to 
establish that the agencies would not have discrjm in ated against 
th em if fund te rrnina~ion procc2dings hnd been brought. Petrs 
contend thRt the Phi l adelphia Police Dcp't probably wo uld have 
discrjminated even if a ~und termination pro:eeding had been 
initiated . Petn, at 18, n . lB. Yet resps may be able to 
establish that the grant of LEA~ f unds had a "significant 
tendency t.o facilitate , reinfor.;c, and support ..• 
discrimination." Norwood v. Hc~r ri son , 413 u.s., at 466. See 
also Green v. Connil-lly, 330F.-Supp.-ll50 (D.D.C. 1971 ), _?ff 'q 
sub nom. Coit v. Green, 44 0 u.s. 997 (1971) (black school 
children ha.ve stanC!ing to challenge i!.!:!Y amount of slate support 




met. Thus, I do not think petrs are in a position that is wholly 
analogous to that of criminal prosecutors. 
Petrs would surely contend that they are entitled to 
absolute immunity as to each of resps' claims, although they have 
only discussed resps' Fifth Amendment claim. Resps contend that 
they also allegea violations of the Act and of §1985(3). Neither 
the CA nor the DC discussed the various causes of action alleged 
in the complaint. The complaint is not included in the petn or 
the response, and the record has not been filed with th e Court. 
I recommend calling for the record. This should shed some light 
on the standing issue, on the scope of the absolute jmrnunity 
issue presented in this case, and on the second and third 
questions raised in the cert petn. If the Court is inclined to 
grant cert to consider the absolute immunity issue, it should 
consider limiting the grant to that question, since the lower 
courts have not expressly considered whether the complaint states 
a claim under the Fifth Amendment violation? or whether petrs aLe 
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. If the 
complaint is well drafted , I imagine petrs will not be able to 
prevail on those grounds at this stage of t he litigation. 
There is a response. 
3/17/81 Peterson Opinion ln petn. 
?Although petrs and resps claim that the CA did no t 
consi der whether resps' complaint stated a claim under the Fifth 
Amendment, the CA did state ir1 a footnote that petrs had a 
constitutional duty not to allow federal funds to be us ed in a 
discriminatory manner by recipients. Petn, at 6a, n.lS. 
jo.) .• 
. . ; . 
I I ,• 
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1st DRAFT ~-~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1074 
RICHARD W. VELDE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NA-
TIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1982] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This litigation was commenced in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia in 1975, and has 
wended its way here in the interim without ever having gone 
to trial on the "merits" of respondents' allegations of discrimi-
nation on the part of petitioners. Because we conclude, for 
the reasons hereafter stated, that respondents lack standing 
to maintain the claims against petitioners which they seek to 
litigate in this action, we conclude, with a natural reluctance 
after the amount of effort invested in the suit by the parties, 
that the action should have been dismissed by the District 
Court. The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit having held otherwise, the judgment of 
that court is reversed and the cause remanded with appropri-
ate instructions. Because each of the parties to the contro-
versy has always had at least one "fall-back" position, it may 
well be that the "standing" issue · was not as forcefully pre-
sented to the Court of Appeals as might have been the case, 
since that Court treated the question in a footnote. But 
since standing is an Art. III requirement for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the federal courts, we cannot avoid the neces-
sity of making a determination on this point previous to the 
examination of the "merits" of the other claims tendered by 
the litigants. 
80-1074-0PINION 
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I 
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 
was established by Congress in 1968 to provide financial and 
technical assistance to state and local law enforcement agen-
cies. See Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3701-3781 
(1976). 1 Congress amended the enabling statute in 1973 by 
adding§ 518(c)(l), which prohibits recipients of LEAA grants 
from discriminating against any person "on the ground of 
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex." 87 Stat. 214, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C. §3766(c)(1) (1976). 2 
In 1975, respondents brought suit in United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, claiming that the LEAA 
had shirked its constitutional and statutory responsibility not 
to fund state and local police departments that unlawfully dis-
criminate on the basis of race and gender. Respondents 
1 Congress substantially restructured the LEAA in 1979. See Justice 
System Improvement Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 1167, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3701-3797 
(1976 ed., Supp. III). Those changes do not affect our resolution of this 
case. 
2 Congress also provided a mechanism for enforcing § 518(c)(l), once the 
LEAA determines that a recipient of federal funds has violated its man-
date. During the period relevant to this litigation, the LEAA was first 
required to notify the chief executive of the State and to request that he 
"secure compliance." 87 Stat. 214, 42 U. S. C. § 3766(c)(2) (1970 ed., 
Supp. V). If this effort failed , the LEAA was directed to "exercise the 
powers and functions provided in section 509." Ibid. Section 509 pro-
vided that once the LEAA had determined "after reasonable notice and 
opportunity for a hearing" that there had been "a substantial failure to 
comply," it was to notify the grant recipient that funding would be sus-
pended until compliance was forthcoming. 87 Stat. 211-212, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 3757 (1970 ed., Supp. V). 
The LEAA was also authorized to institute civil suits to compel compli-
ance. 87 Stat. 214, 42 U. S. C. §3266(c)(2)(A) (1970 ed., Supp. V). In 
addition, Congress granted the Attorney General authority to bring suit 
against state or local governments to remedy a "pattern or practice" in vi-
olation of §518(c)(1). 87 Stat. 214, 42 U. S. C. §3266(c)(3) (1970 ed. , 
Supp. V). 
80-1074--0PINION 
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named as defendants the LEAA and the Department of Jus-
tice, as well as the four federal officials who are petitioners in 
this Court. 3 The complaint sought a permanent injunction 
requiring the LEAA (1) to suspend and terminate all LEAA 
funding to law enforcement agencies that had been "judicially 
determined to be in violation of federal civil rights laws"; (2) 
to initiate hearings leading toward a suspension of funds to all 
law enforcement agencies "which have been or should have 
been determined by defendant LEAA to be in civil rights 
non-compliance"; (3) to initiate proceedings to recover LEAA 
funds unlawfully spent by these agencies; and (4) to award 
funds only to agencies that are complying with the civil rights 
laws. Respondents also sought $20,000,000 in damages from 
petitioners for "willful[ly] and malicious[ly] refus[ing] ... to 
insure that LEAA funding is not awarded to governmental 
law enforcement agencies engaged in racially or sexually dis-
criminatory employment practices." 4 
The government moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, 
for summary judgment. In support of these motions, the 
government argued, inter alia, that respondents lacked 
standing to challenge the LEAA's refusal to terminate fund-
ing. Both sets of parties submitted affidavits and memo-
randa, after which the District Court dismissed respondents' 
complaint. 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting all of the 
government's contentions. 631 F. 2d 784 (CADC 1980). 
Applying the doctrine of official immunity as most recently 
stated in Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), the court 
rejected petitioners' claim of official immunity, holding that 
they possessed "virtually no discretion under the relevant 
3 The four officials were Attorney General Edward Levi, LEAA Admin-
istrator Richard Velde, LEAA Deputy Administrator Charles Work, and 
the Director of the LEAA's Office of Civil Rights Compliance, Herbert 
Rice. 
' 1 App. 43-44. 
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statute in deciding whether to terminate LEAA funding of 
discriminatory recipients." Id., at 787. As previously indi-
cated, the Court of Appeals treated the issue of standing in a 
footnote, observing that respondents had "alleged violations 
of their right to be free from federal funding of state and local 
agencies that have discriminated against them." Id., at 788, 
n. 16. In the court's view, this allegation was sufficient to 
confer standing since it demonstrated a "personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 
204 (1962), and fell within the "zone of interests" protected by 
the statutory and constitutional provisions on which respond-
ents' cause of action rested. Ibid. 5 
We granted certiorari, 451 U. S. -- (1981), and now re-
verse, having concluded that respondents are without stand-
ing to obtain the relief sought in their complaint. 
II 
Respondents in this action are a national organization and 
12 individuals, six of whom are black and six of whom are 
women. 6 According to their complaint, the National Black 
Police Association (NBP A) is composed of more than 50 local 
and regional organizations whose members are black law en-
forcement personnel. By its own description, the NBP A 
5 The dissenting judge agreed that respondents had standing, but for dif-
ferent reasons. He rejected the idea that respondents could satisfy the 
standing requirement by "claiming an injury merely in the fact that the de-
fendants fund unlawful discrimination, without regard to whether they 
personally are victims of the discrimination." 631 F. 2d, at 789, n. 7. In 
his view, however, respondents had alleged personal injury "sufficient to 
resist a·motion to dismiss." Id., at 791. 
• Respondents also claimed to represent a class "composed of all black 
and female persons who have been discriminated against in employment on 
grounds of race or sex by law enforcement agencies which have received or 11 •7 
I I HPP . I • currently receive LEAA funding." l-d., ttt 17. The District Court dis-
missed the action before ruling on respondents' motion for class 
certification. 
80-1074-0PINION 
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"has undertaken vast efforts in pursuit of its objectives of 
achieving federal enforcement of civil rights laws requiring 
equal employment opportunity for blacks and women in law 
enforcement." 7 Many of its member organizations have ini-
tiated employment discrimination suits against particular law 
enforcement agencies, and many of these agencies receive 
grants from the LEAA. 
The individual respondents reside in cities scattered 
throughout the country, from Philadelphia to Honolulu. 
None claims affiliation with respondent NBP A or any of its 
member organizations, though they have been allies in court. 
Four of the individuals sought, but were denied, employment 
by local or state law enforcement agencies. At the time suit 
was initiated, seven others were employed as law enforce-
ment personnel, but had been denied promotion by their em-
ployers. One other had been employed as a police officer but 
was discharged prior to commencement of this suit. Seven 
of these individuals have either filed or intervened in employ-
ment discrimination suits against their actual or prospective 
employers, and the remainder have filed discrimination 
charges with state or federal administrative agencies. All 
have complained to the LEAA of race- or gender-based 
discrimination at the hands of LEAA grant recipients. 8 
The nature of the injuries respondents seek to redress has 
been a subject of contention since this litigation began. 
Many of petitioners' arguments have been premised on the 
understanding that respondents' claims of injury derive from 
discriminatory treatment by their actual or prospective em-
ployers in the field of law enforcement. 9 Respondents have 
' I d., at 22. 
8 See id., at 26-41; 2 App. 346-493. 
• In particular, petitioners have questioned the causal connection be-
tween their administration of the LEAA funding program and any dis-
criminatory treatment by grant recipients at the state or local level. Peti-
tioners also argued in the District Court that because of respondents' 
allegations of injury at the hands of state and local law enforcement agen-
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strenuously objected to this characterization. Because a 
correct understanding is central to our decision, particularly 
in view of the varied composition of the respondents as a 
group, we address the question of the nature of the injuries 
sought to be redressed, as we interpret it from the materials 
available, in some detail. 
We turn first to the pleadings. In their amended com-
plaint, respondents state their intention "to redress the viola-
tion of their constitutional and statutory rights to nondis-
crimination in federally funded law enforcement programs." 
1 App. 13. They allege that they have been "discriminated 
against by the defendants through their refusal to terminate 
LEAA funding to discriminatory law enforcement agencies." 
Id., at 14. This allegation ofharm is repeated individually as 
to each respondent. !d., at 14-15. 10 Each of the individual 
respondents also alleges that he or she has been the victim of 
employment discrimination practiced by a state or local law 
enforcement agency, but none attributes this to petitioners. 
The only injury attributed to petitioners consists of "their re-
fusal to terminate LEAA funding to discriminatory law en-
forcement agencies." ld., at 14. 
This position was clarified in memoranda submitted to the 
District Court. For example, respondents explained: 
"Contrary to defendants' extensive effort to have this 
Court believe otherwise, plaintiffs simply do not ask this 
cies, those agencies were indispensable parties whose joinder was re-
quired. Petitioners also maintained that equitable relief was unwarranted 
since respondents had adequate remedies at law through suits against the 
offending police departments. 
10 In addition, respondent NBP A alleged that petitioners' failure to per-
form their civil rights obligations has harmed the organization and its mem-
bers by "wholly frustrat[ing] [their] primary objectives and efforts," by 
"denying equal employment rights to blacks and women," by limiting the 
"pool of potential members" on which they could draw, and by requiring 
them "to file administrative complaints and costly lawsuits." 1 App. 
25-26. 
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Court to make findings about or enter orders designed to 
alter the employment practices of local law enforcement 
agencies. Rather, the 'basic evil' in this case is defend-
ants' independent defiance of the law, not the failure of 
state and local agencies to live up to their separate con-
stitutional and statutory obligations. Regardless of the 
impact the deprivation of LEAA funds might have on 
the discriminatory employment practices of local agen-
cies, ... the instant case is not dependent upon a predic-
tion that local police departments will stop discriminat-
ing if their federal financial assistance is terminated." 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Op-
position to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Sum-
mary Judgment, Record 41, at 3 (emphasis in original). 
Respondents emphasized that petitioners had forsaken "a 
duty owed to plaintiffs not to have federal monies distributed 
to discriminatory activities." I d., at 13. 
At the hearing in the District Court on petitioners' motion 
to dismiss or for summary judgment, counsel for respondents 
reiterated: 
"We do not seek any relief against police departments. 
We do not have any claims of injury by police depart-
ments. This case is an action against federal officials for 
what these federal officials have done, which we contend 
are extreme violations of their constitutional and statu-
tory obligations if they perform those obligations. We 
don't know whether the local Police Department itself is 
discriminating or not. That is not our claim." Tr. 22. 
The same position was pressed in the Court of Appeals. 
Respondents explained that petitioners had mistaken their 
claim of injury as arising from discrimination by state and 
local law enforcement agencies. 
"This is not the legal injury which forms the basis of this 
lawsuit. Rather, the legal injury which plaintiffs suffer 
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is defendants' knowing funding of discriminatory law en-
forcement agencies in contravention of constitutional and 
statutory obligations owed by defendants to plaintiffs." 
Reply Brief for Appellants 27, quoted in 631 F. 2d, at 
789, n. 7 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original). 
Finally, respondents have argued in this Court that they 
do not seek "to impose restrictions upon petitioners on the 
basis of petitioners' relationship to discriminating grantees." 
Brief for Respondents 37, n. 36. "Since [respondents'] alle-
gations concerned the behavior and constitutional obligations 
of petitioners-and not the discriminatory practices of their 
grantees-any uncertainty about how those grantees might 
have responded had petitioners undertaken any civil rights 
enforcement efforts does not affect respondents' cause of ac-
tion against petitioners." Id., at 12 (emphasis in original). 
Respondents were injured "by petitioners' refusals to carry 
out their constitutional and statutory civil rights obligations 
and by petitioners' consequent continuation of federal fund-
ing to grantees which were also discriminating against re-
spondents .... " I d., at 39. 
III 
As we stated earlier this Term, "[t]he judicial power of the 
United States defined by Art. III is not an unconditioned au-
thority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or ex-
ecutive acts." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State,-- U.S.--, 
-- (1982). "Art. III obligates a federal court to act only 
when it is assured of the power to do so, that is, when it is 
called upon to resolve an actual case or controversy. Then, 
and only then, may it ... presume to provide a forum for the 
adjudication of rights." I d., at --, n. 13. An integral fea-
ture of Art. III's limitation of the judicial power is the re-
quirement of standing. In Valley Forge, supra, we re-
viewed the blend of constitutional and prudential ingredients 
that compose the concept of standing. We concluded: 
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"[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the 
party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he 
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury 
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defend-
ant,' Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision,' Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)." 
ld., at--. 
The threshold question in this case, as in every case, is 
whether respondents' allegations of injury are sufficient to 
satisfy these constitutional preconditions to the exercise of 
the judicial power. 11 
A 
Each of the individual respondents in this case has claimed 
to be a victim of employment discrimination practiced by a 
recipient of LEAA funds. 12 The recipient agencies, how-
ever, are not defendants in this suit, and petitioners, who 
were named as defendants, have questioned the causal con-
nection between their actions and the discriminatory treat-
11 Although petitioners questioned respondents' standing in both the Dis-
trict Court and the Court of Appeals, they have chosen not to do so in this 
Court. Nevertheless, we must address the issue sua sponte since our ju-
risdiction turns on its resolution. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 260 (1977). 
12 Respondents sought to maintain this suit on behalf of a class composed 
of "all black or female persons who have been discriminated against in em-
ployment" by LEAA grant recipients. 1 App. 17. The District Court 
dismissed their suit prior to ruling on the motion for class certification. 
Respondents' desire to act in a representative capacity, however, "adds 
nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who repre-
sent a class 'must allege and show that they personally have been injured, 
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the 
class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.' " Simon 
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40, n. 20 (1976) 
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975)). 
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ment allegedly suffered by respondents. In reply to this 
challenge, respondents have steadfastly maintained that 
discrimination against them by LEAA grantees is not the in-
jury they seek to redress. They argue that their injury con-
sists of "petitioners' refusal to carry out their constitutional 
and statutory civil rights obligations." Brief for Respond-
ents 39. 
This claim is no more an "injury" sufficient to confer stand-
ing than was the claim advanced earlier this Term in Valley 
Forge, supra. The plaintiffs in Valley Forge were a national 
organization and several of its members committed to main-
taining the constitutional separation of church and state. 
They challenged the federal government's transfer of surplus 
real property to a church-affiliated school. The Court of Ap-
peals correctly doubted plaintiffs' standing as taxpayers, but 
found standing based on their allegation of "'injury in fact' to 
their shared individuated right to a government that 'shall 
make no law respecting the establishment of religion."' 
-- U. S., at--. We rejected this conception of stand-
ing, noting that "assertion of a right to a particular kind of 
government conduct, which the government has violated by 
acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of 
Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning." 
I d. , at --. Plaintiffs lacked standing because they had 
failed to identify any personal injury suffered "as a conse-
quimce of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psy-
chological consequence presumably produced by observation 
of conduct with which one disagrees." ld., at-- (empha-
sis in original). 
Respondents' claim of injury is of a kind with that of the 
plaintiffs in Valley Forge. Respondents have asserted a 
right to a government that does not provide financial assis-
tance to law enforcement agencies that practice employment 
discrimination. 13 The "injury" on which they predicate 
standing is the government's failure to act according to this 
13 Respondents identify several sources of this right, including the Fifth 
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expectation, or in respondents' terms, the violation of "a duty 
owed to plaintiffs not to have federal monies distributed to 
discriminatory activities." Record 41, at 13. Without alle-
gations of some tangible and personal consequence affecting 
respondents as a result of this breach of duty, it cannot confer 
standing unless the courts are to be impressed into an "amor-
phous general supervision of the operations of government." 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 192 (1974) (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Allegations of legal right are the lin-
gua franca of the judicial process, but they remain abstrac-
tions, inadequate to command the attention of Art. III courts 
until linked to some "distinct and palpable injury," Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501, suffered by those who raise them. 
Respondents have pointed to Norwood v. Harrison, 413 
U. S. 455 (1973), to buttress their claim of standing. At 
issue in Norwood was the validity of a Mississippi statutory 
program under which the State loaned textbooks to nonsec-
tarian private schools that admitted only white students. 
We held that the loan program was unconstitutional because 
"it significantly aid[ed] the organization and continuation of a 
separate system of [segregated] private schools," id., at 467, 
at a time when their marked growth in admissions coincided 
with desegregation of the public schools, see id., at 457. 
This program violated the State's "constitutional obligation 
to steer clear, not only of operating the old dual system of ra-
cially segregated schools, but also of giving aid to institutions 
that practice racial or other invidious discrimination." Ibid. 
Respondents have alleged that petitioners are under the 
same constitutional obligation, and that their failure to abide 
by it, without more, constitutes a cognizable injury to re-
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, §§ 509 and 518(c) of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3757, 3766(c), Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. , various other 
civil rights laws, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and Executive Orders 
11246 and 11375. Of course, we express no views on the validity of these 
claims, or on the existence of private causes of action to enforce them. 
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spondents. However much this reference to Norwood, 
supra, might aid respondents' position on the merits, it adds 
nothing of substance to the claim of standing we have already 
discussed and rejected. One who seeks to force another to 
comply with an asserted constitutional duty still must show 
that he has been adversely affected in some tangible way as a 
consequence of the defendant's unlawful conduct. The plain-
tiffs in Norwood acted on behalf of their school-aged children 
who lived in a community in which all white children had been 
withdrawn from the public schools and enrolled in a private, 
racially segregated academy staffed by the former principal 
and 17 teachers from the public school system. I d., at 467, 
n. 9. They acted to protect their "personal interest ... in 
admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondis-
criminatory basis." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 
U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II). Respondents' claims are 
not transmuted into a similarly personal interest simply by 
citation to Norwood. 
B 
The bases for standing asserted by respondent NBP A are 
no more convincing. First, the NBP A asserts that petition-
ers' "refusal to enforce their constitutional and statutory civil 
rights obligations has wholly frustrated [the NBPA's] pri-
mary objectives and efforts." 14 Our prior decisions have 
clearly established, however, "that an organization's abstract 
concern with a subject that could be affected by an adjudica-
tion does not substitute for the concrete injury required by 
Art. III." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U. S. 26, 40 (1976). The NBP A's devotion to eradicating 
employment discrimination in the field of law enforcement is 
no more a basis for standing than the interest of the individ-
ual respondents in a government that does not fund discrimi-
natory activities. 
'
4 1 App. 25. 
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The NBP A also claims injury because petitioners' conduct 
"has required NBP A member organizations and their mem-
bers to file administrative complaints and costly lawsuits to 
obtain their civil rights." These activities, in turn, allegedly 
have exposed the NBP A and its member organizations to 
"extra-legal sanctions and harassment." 15 This argument is 
but a variant of the position that organizational standing can 
exist by virtue of the organization's commitment to goals that 
might be served by a favorable decision in the matter sub 
judice. That the organization has incurred financial expense 
and the risk of "extra-legal harassment" is evidence of the 
depth of its interest, but "a mere 'interest in a problem,' no 
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how well 
qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not 
sufficient by itself" to establish standing. Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739 (1972). Were the law otherwise, 
an organization could demonstrate its standing to litigate any 
issue simply by filing the complaint. 
Since the NBP A has failed to establish injury to itself as an 
organization, it can allege standing only as a representative 
of its members. 16 It can do so only if those members "are 
suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the 
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable 
case had the members themselves brought suit." Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U. S., at 511. See Hunt v. Washington State 
•• !d., at 26. 
'
6 The NBPA also alleged that it has been injured because petitioners' 
conduct "has served to limit the already limited pool of potential members 
of plaintiff NBPA and of its member organizations." Ibid. By this, the 
NBPA presumably claims that persons who might otherwise have become 
law enforcement personnel, and thus might have joined one of the NBPA's 
member organizations, have been denied employment, or have been dis-
charged, because of petitioners' official actions. This allegation is but an-
other attempt to predicate standing on the NBP A's organizational interest 
in the subject of this litigation, and it must therefore fail for the reasons 
stated in the text. See also Part IV, infra. 
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Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333, 342-343 (1977); 
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 
39-40. The NBP A's members are themselves organizations, 
composed of black law enforcement personnel. Insofar as 
the complaint alleges injury to those personnel, the NBP A's 
claims are no different from those raised by the individual re-
spondents in this suit. Our disposition of their claims of 
standing, therefore, are also applicable to the NBPA. 
IV 
As we have noted, respondents have steadfastly divorced 
their claims against petitioners from their treatment at the 
hands of state and local law enforcement agencies who re-
ceive LEAA funds. In their brief to this Court, however, 
respondents have also assumed arguendo that "petitioners' 
mischaracterization of this case" was correct, i. e., that "re-
spondents' only injury was caused not by petitioners' . . . vi-
olations but by the discrimination practiced by LEAA grant-
ees." Brief for Respondents 40. Though respondents 
reached this position reluctantly, and then only hypotheti-
cally, it is now the only remaining basis on which they can 
claim standing. On the understanding that it is a claim 
which might fairly be read in the complaint, we consider it, 
but ultimately find it unpersuasive. 
A 
A litigant's claim that he has been discriminated against by 
his employer or by one from whom he sought employment is 
plainly a claim of injury on which Art. III standing might be 
predicated. At stake is the opportunity to earn a livelihood 
and to advance within one's field of work, unhampered by ir-
rational and invidious restrictions. Respondents have made 
such claims, but they have not sued their employers. They 
have sued federal officials who possessed varying degrees of 
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responsibility for administering programs that provide tech-
nical and financial assistance to those employers in conduct-
ing legitimate law enforcement activities. 
Essential to respondents' claim of standing, therefore, are 
allegations sufficient to show that the claimed injury "fairly 
can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
[is] not injury that results from the independent action of 
some third party not before the court." Simon v. Eastern 
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 41-42. 17 This 
causal connection is implicit in the Art. III requirement that 
a plaintiff bring to court not merely a complaint that the de-
fendant has acted unlawfully, but a claim that in so doing he 
has tangibly injured the plaintiff. If the source of plaintiff's 
injury lies elsewhere, then he lacks the necessary personal 
stake in the adjudication of defendant's conduct which Art. 
III demands. 
Respondents must also show that their injury "is likely to 
be redressed by a favorable decision." I d., at 38. 18 This in-
dependent showing is necessary to assure that the decisions 
of the federal courts are not merely advisory pronounce-
ments. The judicial power does not extend to the issuance of 
decrees that are ineffective to remedy the injury on which a 
17 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa· 
tion of Church and State,- U. S. -,-(1982); Watt v. Energy Ac-
tion Educational Foundation,- U.S.-,- (1981); Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S., at 261; 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 504 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 
u. s. 614, 617-618 (1973). 
'
8 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State, supra, at-; Watt v. Energy Action Educa-
tional Foundation, supra, at-; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmen-
tal Study Group, supra, at 72, 75 n. 20; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Dev. Corp., supra, at 262; Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 504; Linda 
R.S. v. Richard D., supra, at 618. 
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litigant's claim of standing is predicated. These require-
ments are but natural corollaries of the more fundamental 
principle that the power of the federal courts to declare the 
rights of individuals and to measure the authority of govern-
ments "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity 
in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy." 
Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 
345 (1892). 
The conclusion that respondents have failed to satisfy ei-
ther requirement is virtually compelled by our rejection of a 
similar claim of standing in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Org., supra. In Simon, the plaintiffs were indi-
gents and several organizations representing indigents who 
brought suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, challenging a Revenue 
Ruling that allowed favorable tax treatment to nonprofit hos-
pitals that offered only emergency-room services to indi-
gents. Most of the plaintiffs alleged that they had been de-
nied access to hospital services on account of their poverty, 
and that each of the hospitals involved had taken advantage 
of the Revenue Ruling by securing tax-exempt charitable sta-
tus. Plaintiffs argued that the Internal Revenue Code com-
pelled defendants to deny tax-exempt status to hospitals that 
refused to provide them full service. 
We recognized that denial of access to medical services was 
an injury on which standing might be predicated. We ob-
served, however, that 
"injury at the hands of a hospital is insufficient by itself 
to establish a case or controversy in the context of this 
suit, for no hospital is a defendant. The only defendants 
are officials of the Department of the Treasury, and the 
only claims of illegal action respondents desire the courts 
to adjudicate are charged to those officials. . . . [T]he 
'case or controversy' limitation of Art. III still requires 
that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly 
can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, 
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and not injury that results from the independent action 
of some third party not before the court." 426 U. S., at 
41-42. 
We accepted plaintiffs' allegation that the challenged Rev-
enue Ruling had "encouraged" hospitals to deny services to 
indigents, but we nevertheless rejected their claim of stand-
ing. First, we found it "purely speculative whether the de-
nials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced 
to petitioners' 'encouragement' or instead result[ed] from de-
cisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax impli-
cations." Id., at 42-43. Second, we found it "equally specu-
lative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial 
powers in this suit would result in the availability to [plain-
tiffs] of such services." I d., at 43. It was "just as plausible 
that the hospitals to which [plaintiffs] may apply for service 
would elect to forego favorable tax treatment to avoid the un-
determined financial drain of an increase in the level of un-
compensated services." Ibid. 
Respondents' position in this case is no more tenable than 
that of the plaintiffs in Simon. Respondents allege that they 
have been discriminated against by state and local law en-
forcement agencies. As in Simon, however, the defendants 
are not those alleged to have inflicted the injury, but federal 
officials whose administration of statutory programs has re-
sulted in a financial benefit to those persons. Whether the 
discriminatory treatment is fairly traceable to petitioners' re-
fusal to terminate LEAA funding or whether it is instead 
attributable to the independent decisions of the state and 
local agencies is at least as speculative as the causal connec-
tion examined in Simon. Indeed, unlike the plaintiffs in 
Simon, who alleged that the defendants' Revenue Ruling 
"encouraged" the hospitals to deny them services, respond-
ents have made no similar claims in their amended complaint. 
We also lack confidence that the relief sought by respond-
ents would end the employment discrimination under which 
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they claim to have labored. Respondents have prayed for an 
order requiring the LEAA to suspend funding to all law en-
forcement agencies "which have been or should have been de-
termined by defendant LEAA to be in civil rights non-com-
pliance." 19 Whether such an order would provide respond-
ents jobs where employment was denied, or promotion where 
an opportunity for advancement was restricted, is, as in 
Simon, a matter of "unadorned speculation." I d., at 44. 
Respondents plainly attribute their frustration in the work-
place to racial or gender-based discrimination, but there is no 
reasonable assurance that the LEAA will, or ought to, con-
cur in that judgment. Even in those instances in which fund 
termination would be guaranteed by the order requested-as 
where the LEAA or a court has already found employment 
discrimination by a respondent's employer and that employer 
still has not complied with the law-the likelihood that the 
employer will in turn provide respondent favorable treat-
ment depends on a chain of speculative inferences that is sim-
ply too tenuous to establish standing. 20 
'
9 1 App. 44. 
20 Some law enforcement agencies may indeed subscribe to racial or gen-
der-based criteria in their hiring or promotion decisions, and they may re-
luctantly suppress their prejudices in order to preserve federal funding. 
This in turn may benefit respondents. In other instances, however, the 
agencies may value particular methods of selecting or promoting personnel 
that have nothing to do with racial or gender-based animus. They may 
conclude that these methods are more valuable to law enforcement than 
LEAA funding, and they may decide to forego federal assistance rather 
than sacrifice them. All of these possibilities, of course, depend on the ex-
tent to which the agencies are dependent on federal assistance, the values 
they assign to the practices respondents have challenged, and the connec-
tion between those practices and respondents' misfortunes. As in Simon, 
"the complaint suggests no substantial likelihood that victory in this suit 
would result in respondents' receiving the ... treatment they desire." 
426 U. S., at 45-46. 
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B 
Anticipating our concern about the redressability aspect of 
standing, respondents again seek to derive support from 
Norwood v. Harrison, supra. The District Court in that 
case upheld the State's textbook loan program, in part be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to prove that elimination of text-
book loans to discriminatory private schools would cause chil-
dren to leave them and enroll in public schools. See 413 
U. S., at 465. We accepted this factual uncertainty, but 
held that 
"the Constitution does not permit the State to aid 
discrimination even when there is no precise causal rela-
tionship between state financial aid to a private school 
and the continued well-being of that school. A State 
may not grant the type of tangible financial aid here in-
volved if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate, 
reinforce, and support private discrimination." I d., at 
465-466. 
Respondents' reliance on this language is again misplaced. 
The question in Norwood was whether the State had violated 
the Constitution by loaning textbooks to private academies 
whose admissions policies were racially discriminatory. The 
question was not, as it is here, whether the plaintiffs had 
standing to raise that constitutional question. As we have 
already noted, the plaintiffs in Norwood represented black 
schoolchildren who lived in a community in which all white 
children had withdrawn from the public schools in reaction to 
the process of desegregation and had enrolled in segregated 
academies which the State aided through its loan program. 
As we observed in a later decision, "[t]he plaintiffs in Nor-
wood were parties to a school desegregation order and the re-
lief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury 
they suffered." Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U. S. 
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556, 570--571, n. 10 (1974). Indeed, in Gilmore we expressed 
doubt about the plaintiffs' standing to challenge conduct not 
reasonably related to the preservation of the existing decree. 
Ibid. 
The plaintiffs in Norwood suffered from discriminatory 
treatment within a dual school system established and main-
tained by the State. They had secured a remedial decree di-
rected against the State, and they were acting to prevent the 
State from circumventing or undermining that decree by 
"significantly aid[ing] the organization and continuation of a 
separate system of private schools." Norwood v. Harrison, 
supra, at 467. The respondents in this case have alleged em-
ployment discrimination, not by petitioners, but by state and 
local agencies who have not been named as defendants. A 
fortiori, they are not seeking in this action to preserve the ef-
ficacy of remedial decrees already entered against those 
agencies. They are suing federal officials charged with ad-
ministering programs that have aided the agencies in per-
forming legitimate activities. Whether they would succeed 
in proving a constitutional violation on the merits is not rele-
vant in establishing a substantial likelihood that the relief 
they seek will alleviate the injury they claim. 
c 
At oral argument before this Court, counsel for respond-
ents maintained that one of the individual respondents, Joel 
Michelle Schumacher, had established standing because a 
threat by the LEAA to terminate funding to the New Or-
leans Police Department, who had denied her employment, 
caused the Department to eliminate the hiring criteria that 
Schumacher had alleged to be discriminatory. According to 
counsel, this satisfied the redressability aspect of standing 
with respect to respondent Schumacher. Citing our decision 
earlier this Term in Watt v. Energy Action Educational 
Foundation, -- U. S. -- (1981), counsel argued that her 
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standing was sufficent to allow the action to proceed, regard-
less of whether the other respondents could also establish 
standing. 
The record does disclose allegations that respondent 
Schumacher sought employment with the New Orleans Po-
lice Department, but was denied a job because she did not 
meet the Department's minimum height requirement. 21 In 
early 1975 she filed a complaint with the LEAA's Office of 
Civil Rights Compliance, alleging that the height require-
ment discriminated on the basis of sex. She also sought to 
intervene in a suit against the Department pending in federal 
court which also challenged the height requirement. The 
LEAA eventually threatened to terminate its funding and to 
"notify the Office of Revenue Sharing and other interested 
federal agencies" if the Department did not abolish the height 
restriction. 22 In response, the Superintendent of Police rec-
ommended to the City's Civil Service Commission that the 
requirement be eliminated. 23 
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), a developer and three individuals 
challenged a municipality's denial of a rezoning request that 
would have permitted the developer to construct low-cost 
housing in which the individual respondents wished to live. 
We found that one of the individuals had demonstrated stand-
ing, and it was therefore unnecessary to consider whether 
the other plaintiffs and intervenors had standing to maintain 
the suit. Id., at 263-264 and n. 9. In Watt v. Energy Ac-
tion Educational Foundation, supra, we considered a chal-
lenge to the Secretary of the Interior's decision not to use 
21 1 App. 34. 
22 App. to Defendants' "Statement of Reasons," Record 36, at 6. 
23 This action was taken "in light of the imminent threat of the loss of 
LEAA funding to the New Orleans Police Department as well as the threat 
to our City's general revenue sharing funds." Letter from Superintendent 
of Police Clarence Giarrusso to Andrew Strojny, LEAA Office of Civil 
Rights Compliance 3 (Oct. 29, 1975), Record 36, Exh. 10. 
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particular bidding systems in leasing tracts for oil and gas ex-
ploration on the Outer Continental Shelf. We found that the 
State of California had established standing to challenge the 
Secretary's decision and consequently we did not consider the 
claims of the other plaintiffs. I d., at --. 
In both cases, all of the plaintiffs were aggrieved by the 
same decision. Given the nature of the decisions challenged, 
once the standing of one plaintiff was established, the stand-
ing of the remaining plaintiffs became superfluous. The first 
plaintiff fully demonstrated an injury redressable by the 
court which fairly could be traced to a decision of which the 
remaining plaintiffs also complained. This case, however, 
arises in a different context. The individual respondents 
have each alleged different injuries, consisting of various 
forms of discriminatory treatment by different LEAA grant 
recipients. The conduct of which they complain consists of a 
variety of individual decisions regarding termination of funds 
to different recipients. Obviously, the nature of those deci-
sions, as well as their effect on the individual respondents, 
will vary from case to case. 
In addition, the respondents seek not merely injunctive re-
lief, but damages, which are not shared by all of them in 
equal degree. "[W]hatever injury may have been suffered is 
peculiar to the individual . . . , and both the fact and extent of 
injury would require individualized proof." Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 515-516. Thus, even if respondent Schu-
macher has established standing as to her own claim, she is 
without standing either to question petitioners' decisions to 
continue funding other law enforcement agencies throughout 
the country, or to seek damages on behalf of other individuals 
who might have been injured as a consequence. 
We have also determined, however, that respondent 
Schumacher has not established standing to press her own 
claim, much less the claims of others. The injury that she 
alleges, the denial of employment with the New Orleans Po-
lice Department, is no more "fairly traceable" to petitioners' 
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funding decisions than the claimed injuries of the other re-
spondents. The decision to adopt a height requirement was 
certainly not unique to LEAA grant recipients, and "un-
adorned speculation" is required to link that decision to peti-
tioners' administration of the LEAA assistance program. 
In addition, although the LEAA eventually did threaten to 
terminate funding, and although the Police Department 
thereafter eliminated the height requirement, this estab-
lishes only that at the time the amended complaint was filed, 
respondent Schumacher's prospects for employment were no 
longer barred by the allegedly discriminatory practice of 
which she complained. 24 It does not establish that whatever 
injury remains is redressable by a suit against petitioners 
challenging their failure to threaten fund termination. That 
connection is still speculative. It depends on the assump-
tions that petitioners should have determined earlier than 
they did that the Police Department was practicing gender 
discrimination and that the Police Department would then 
have eliminated the requirement as a result of the LEAA's 
threat to terminate its funding. Indeed, whether the De-
partment's actual decision to abandon the height requirement 
was attributable to that threat, rather than the companion 
threat to place the City's revenue sharing funds in jeopardy 
or the risk of an adverse judgment in the civil rights suit 
against the Department then pending in federal court, is it-
self a matter of speculation. 25 
24 Respondents' amended complaint, which included respondent Schu-
macher's allegations that the LEAA had improperly failed to terminate 
funding, was filed several months after the LEAA had threatened fund 
termination and the New Orleans Police Department had abandoned the 
height requirement. 
25 It is argued that a decision on respondents' standing should be delayed 
until they have an opportunity to conduct discovery and establish their 
standing in evidentiary proceedings. The District Court granted judg-
ment for petitioners before respondents had such an opportunity. Never-
theless, respondents obtained extensive information from the LEAA 
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The claim of injury on which respondents have relied 
throughout this litigation is insufficient to establish their 
standing to maintain suit. The claim of injury which they 
have belatedly raised in this Court is sufficiently concrete for 
purposes of Art. III, but it is not fairly traceable to the 
wrongdoing they ascribe to petitioners, nor is it substantially 
probable that the relief they seek would alleviate their in-
jury. Consequently, the courts below were without jurisdic-
tion to hear this suit, and it must be dismissed. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
through the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552, while suit was 
pending in the District Court, Tr. of Oral Arg. 44, and they submitted nu-
merous affidavits in response to petitioners' motion to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment. Nor have respondents complained of the lack of discov-
ery in answering objections to their standing, since they have relied on a 
claim of injury consisting of petitioners' failure to enforce the civil rights 
laws. 
Moreover, we have held that the question of standing normally is to be 
determined on the pleadings, with leave to support the complaint by affida-
vits. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 115, n. 31 
(1979); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 45 
and n. 25; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501-502. In addition, the plead-
ings "must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the 
conceivable." United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973). It is 
the responsibility of the complainant to "allege specific, concrete facts dem-
onstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally 
would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." Warth v. 
Seldin, supra, at 508. The respondents have failed to allege facts suffi-
cient to establish their standing, and given the nature of the deficiencies, it 
is improbable that discovery from petitioners would supply the missing 
links. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1074 
RICHARD W. VELDE, ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. NA-
TIONAL BLACK POLICE ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
[June 30, 1982] 
PER CURIAM. 
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit for further consideration in light of Harlow & 
Butterfield v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. - (1982). 
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